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Based on the detection loophole-free photon key distribution (PKD) compatible with classical optical 
systems, an optical key distribution (OKD) protocol is presented for unconditionally secured 
cryptography in fiber-optic communications networks using addressable continuous phase basis, 
where each communication channel is composed of paired transmission lines. The unconditional 
security in OKD lies in quantum superposition between the paired lines of each channel. The 
continuous phase basis in OKD can be applied for one-time-pad optical cryptography in networks, 
whose network address capacity is dependent upon the robustness of OKD to channel noises. 
DOI: 
 
Due to the exponential growth of information traffic in fiber-optic backbone networks over the last thirty 
years, the theoretical limit of 100 Tbps in the current single-core fiber will be reached in a decade [1]. Then, 
multi-core fibers should replace the current single-core fibers to keep ever-expanding IT technologies on track 
[1]. This multicore fiber satisfies phase stability in March-Zehnder interferometer (MZI) due to its structural 
robustness [2]. Current information security in the Internet is mostly based on public key cryptography relying 
on computational complexity, resulting in the inherent conditional security [3]. Thus, the Internet security is 
vulnerable to computational power. For the unconditional security from channel eavesdropping, quantum 
cryptography [4] has been studied for quantum key distribution (QKD) over the last thirty years since the first 
advent of QKD protocol of BB84 [5]. In practice, however, QKD security is also fragile to eavesdropping due to 
imperfect detectors and channel noises, resulting in a detection loophole [6]. This practical issue of detection 
loophole puts quantum cryptography in danger even for decoy states [7] for single photons as well as Bell stats 
[8] for entangled photon pairs. For transmission distance, QKD is strongly limited by the no cloning theorem 
[9,10]. Quantum networking requires multipartite entangled photon pairs which is much harder to be 
implemented than the point-to-point QKD [11]. Based on these practical limitations, quantum cryptography 
seems to have a long way to go for commercial applications such as online banking, IoT, and cryptocurrency 
[12]. Most of all, no QKD protocol is compatible with current fiber-optic communications simply due to the no 
cloning theorem as well as nonclassical light usage. 
To solve the limitations in both classical and quantum cryptographies, a photon key distribution (PKD) 
protocol has been proposed recently for the detection loophole-free unconditional security using bright coherent 
lights in paired transmission lines composing a MZI for a single channel [13]. The detection loophole-free is 
from the transmission determinacy in MZI coherence optics. The unconditional security of PKD is based on 
quantum superposition between the paired transmission lines, resulting in complete randomness in 
eavesdropping. According to the information theory, the complete randomness satisfies perfect security [14]. 
Although Eve’s channel measurements are fully allowed in PKD, the measured information cannot be 
distinguished for the discrete keys of ‘0’ and ‘1’ due to the superposition-caused indistinguishability, where 
absolute phase information cannot be measured unless the input phase is known. The input phase information in 
PKD belongs to the transponder, which is beyond the channel security issue. Owing to coherence optics of MZI 
[15,16], PKD is naturally compatible with current optical systems such as optical switches, routers and even 
amplifiers. For the optical amplifiers, the phase between the input and output can be locked technically, so that 
the physics of MZI is kept for the PKD protocol [17]. Owing to the use of bright coherent light pulses as in the 
fiber-optic communications, the key distribution process in PKD is fully deterministic as in the classical 
information processing [13]. Thus, both bit rate and bit error rate of PKD should be compatible with those in 
current fiber-optic communications. The multicore fiber potentially used for the MZI channel is robust to 
environmental noises such as temperatures and vibrations owing to the proximity between cores within a few 
microns, where a relative path length change plays a key role in PKD.  
In this paper, an optical key distribution (OKD) protocol is presented for the detection loophole-free, 
unconditional security compatible with current fiber-optic communications networks, where OKD is an 
addressable PKD by using continuous phase basis (CPB). Compared with a fixed point-to-point transmission 
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scheme in PKD, the addressability in the present OKD is essential for networking. The availability of CPB in 
OKD is owing to the paired phase matching condition in the MZI channel controlled by two sets of phase 
controllers as shown in Fig. 1. The physics of the unconditional security in OKD is in the MZI path 
superposition like in PKD, completely different from all QKD protocols using a single channel governed by no-
cloning theorem of dual bases. The continuity of the phase basis in the present OKD can be directly applied to 
addressable key distribution process for dense wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM) in the future 
multicore fiber-optic networks [18]. 
Figure 1 shows a schematic of the proposed OKD based on double phase-controlled MZI between two 
remote parties, Alice and Bob. Each party has each phase shifter to encode one’s optical keys with a phase 𝜑𝜑1 
for Φ1 (Bob) and 𝜓𝜓1 for Ψ1 (Alice), respectively. The MZI scheme looks similar to the phase encoded BB84 
protocol [19], but completely different in the use of two transmission lines for a single channel and deterministic 
key distribution technique for a round trip. Most of all, the physics of unconditional security in OKD does not 
rely on dual bases resulting in the no cloning theorem [4-10]. The added phase controller Φ2 (Ψ2) is to control 
the encoder Φ1 (Ψ1) for its addressing in networks. In PKD without Φ2 and Ψ2 [13], the MZI satisfies unitary 
transformation if 𝜑𝜑1 = 𝜓𝜓1 is satisfied for a round trip, where 𝜑𝜑1 and 𝜓𝜓1 have the same set of two discrete 
bases: 𝜑𝜑1,𝜓𝜓1 ∈ {0,𝜋𝜋}. Here, we briefly seek a new condition for the unitary transformation in the OKD scheme 
of Fig. 1. Here, the phase basis ‘0’ (‘π’) represents a key ‘0’ (‘1’). 
The matrix representation, [BH], for the phase-controlled round-trip carrier-light pulse in Fig. 1 is as 
follow (see the Supplemental Material): [BH] = 1
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−�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓2+𝜑𝜑1) + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓1+𝜑𝜑2)� 𝑖𝑖�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓2+𝜑𝜑1) − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓1+𝜑𝜑2)�
𝑖𝑖�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓1+𝜑𝜑2) − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓2+𝜑𝜑1)� −�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓2+𝜑𝜑1) + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓1+𝜑𝜑2)��,   (1) 
where, the output light must satisfy the identity and inversion relation for key distribution: �
𝐸𝐸9
𝐸𝐸10
� = [𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵] �𝐸𝐸10 �. 
For this, Bob randomly prepares potential keys and sent them to Alice. Alice randomly chooses her phase basis 
for 𝜓𝜓1 to encode the return light and sends it back to Bob. If the return light E9 (E10) hits the detector B3 (B4), 
it means the identity (inversion) satisfying a raw key (see the Supplementary Material). Unlike QKD, this key 
distribution is fully deterministic without sifting process due to no use of two nonorthogonal bases (dual bases) 
[13]. As a result, the following condition is obtained from equation (1): 
 𝜓𝜓1 + 𝜑𝜑2 = 𝜓𝜓2 + 𝜑𝜑1,       (2) 
where the identity/inversion relation is used for raw keys (discussed in Table 1). For deterministic key 
distribution via transmission directionality in MZI physics, phase matching (𝜓𝜓1 = 𝜑𝜑1) should be satisfied as 
discussed in PKD (see also Fig. 2) [13]. Thus, equation (2) results in 𝜓𝜓2 = 𝜑𝜑2 in the OKD scheme of Fig. 1. 
However, equation (2) lacks the relation between 𝜑𝜑1 and 𝜑𝜑2, so does 𝜓𝜓1 and 𝜓𝜓2. Keeping this in mind, we 
investigate CPB property of OKD for the unconditionally secured networking in a classical regime. 
 
 
Fig. 1. A schematic of cv PKD. LD, Laser diode; OM, Optical modulator; Φ1/Φ2/Ψ1/Ψ2, Phase shifter; 
A1~A4/B1/B3/B4, Photodetector, OD, Optical delay, M, Mirror, Ei, Light i. This distance between Bob 
and Alice is less than or equal to 100 km defined by EDFA in fiber optics communications if there is no 
coherent amplifications, otherwise unlimited (beyond the current scope). 
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The (bright) input light pulse E1 in Fig. 1 is launched from a coherent laser (LD) through an optical 
modulator (OM) by Bob for a random phase basis 𝜑𝜑1 ∈ {0,𝜋𝜋} controlled by the phase shifter Φ1. Suppose that 
Fig. 1 represents one channel out of NxN network channels. The added control phase shifter Φ2 with control 
phase 𝜑𝜑2 (0 ≤ 𝜑𝜑2 ≤ 𝜋𝜋) is used to address the 𝜑𝜑1 −controlled E1, such that only a particular receiver should 
work for the MZI determinacy in OKD by the corresponding control phase 𝜓𝜓2 at the phase shifter Ψ2 
(discussed below). Here, the MZI determinacy represents the phase-dependent transmission directionality: If 
𝜑𝜑1 = 0 (𝜑𝜑1 = 𝜋𝜋) assuming no relative phase shift between two lines of MZI, the detector A1 (A2) always 
clicks for E6 (E5) for 𝜑𝜑2 = 𝜓𝜓2 = 0: The phase 𝜓𝜓1(as well as 𝜓𝜓2) is invisible to the forward transmission of E3 
and E4 [12]. Such fast optical switching is technically available via detector Ai-triggered delay operation. The 
𝜓𝜓1 −controlled return light E8 by Alice is also governed by the same MZI transmission directionality, resulting 
in identity/inversion relation (discussed in Figs. 2 and 3). To the return lights (E7 and E8), both phases 𝜑𝜑1 and 
𝜑𝜑2 are invisible, too. 
Figure 2 shows numerical calculations of the MZI determinacy (transmission directionality) in Fig. 1 for 
the output lights E5 and E6 at Alice’s side. The related matrix representation [MZ]𝜑𝜑1,𝜑𝜑2  of the directionality for 
E5 and E6 is as follow: [MZ]𝜑𝜑1,𝜑𝜑2 = 12 � 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑2 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑1 𝑖𝑖�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑1�𝑖𝑖�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑1� −�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑2 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑1��,    (3) 
where �
𝐸𝐸5
𝐸𝐸6
� = [MZ]𝜑𝜑1,𝜑𝜑2 �𝐸𝐸10 �. In Fig. 1, the added phase 𝜑𝜑2 causes a phase change in the lower transmission 
line for the forward light E3. To compensate it, 𝜑𝜑1 has to be adjusted accordingly for E4 in the upper 
transmission line. Thus, the modified phase at Φ1 must be 𝜑𝜑1 → 𝜑𝜑1 + 𝜑𝜑2. With this modified phase, equation 
(3) can be easily proved for the MZI directionality for an arbitrary value of 𝜑𝜑2. 
 
Fig. 2. Numerical calculations for the transmission directionality in MZI. Visibility V5,6 (solid) and 
Interference IN5,6 (dotted) for (a) φ2 = 0 and (b) φ2 = π/3. (c) V5,6 and (d) IN5,6. 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = �𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗−𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖+𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�, 
where 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 is intensity of 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖. IN5,6 = (𝐸𝐸5 + 𝐸𝐸6) ∙ (𝐸𝐸5 + 𝐸𝐸6)∗. 
For the numerical proofs of the 𝜑𝜑2 −dependent MZI directionality mentioned above, two basis values of 
𝜑𝜑1 ∈ {0,π} are used to test both the visibility V5,6 and interference IN5,6. Here, the interference IN5,6 should be 
the same as IN3,4, representing Eve’s measurement in the channel using the same measurement setup of Alice’s 
(see the Supplementary Material). Figure 2a shows numerical results for 𝜑𝜑2 = 0 as a reference, while Fig. 2b 
is for an arbitrary value of 𝜑𝜑2 = 𝜋𝜋/3. As a typical example of the PKD protocol, two phase bases of 𝜑𝜑1 ∈{0,𝜋𝜋} show the maximum visibilities of 𝑉𝑉5,6 = ±1 in Fig. 2a (see the green dots in the solid curve), while the 
interference, IN5,6 = 1, shows indistinguishability with the same value (see the green and orange dots in the 
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dotted curve) [13]. As discussed in ref. 13, this IN5,6 is the same as IN3,4, showing the physical origin of the 
measurement immunity in the MZI paths: unconditional security (discussed later). The compensated 𝜑𝜑1 
according to the control phase 𝜑𝜑2 is shown in Fig. 2b: 𝜑𝜑1 → 𝜑𝜑1 + 𝜋𝜋/3(𝜑𝜑2). For the maximum visibility 
𝑉𝑉5,6 = ±1, the phase matching condition must be satisfied: 𝜑𝜑1 = 𝜑𝜑1 + 𝜑𝜑2. This linear phase matching relation 
between 𝜑𝜑1 and 𝜑𝜑2 reveals the infinite number of phase choices on 𝜑𝜑2, resulting in the continuous CPB 
characteristics of OKD as shown in Fig. 2c. In other words, the control phase 𝜑𝜑2 can be used for addressing the 
𝜑𝜑1 − provided keys to a specific destination at Alice’s side. The corresponding interference IN5,6 has always 
the same value if 𝜑𝜑1 = 𝜑𝜑1 + 𝜑𝜑2 is satisfied as shown in Fig. 2d. Thus, Fig. 2 proves the 𝜑𝜑2 −dependent MZI 
determinacy in the OKD scheme of Fig. 1 as well as indistinguishability in eavesdropping (discussed later). The 
addressable condition of OKD is 𝜑𝜑1 = 𝜑𝜑1 + 𝜑𝜑2. 
Because 𝜑𝜑1 = 𝜓𝜓1  must be satisfied for the one-way deterministic key transmission in OKD, 𝜓𝜓2  at 
Alice’s side should be equal to 𝜑𝜑2 in the same way to compensate the shifted 𝜓𝜓1 in Fig. 2b (see also equation 
(2) and the Supplementary Material). Figure 3 shows the numerical calculations with addressable CPB variables 
for 𝜑𝜑2 = 𝜓𝜓2 in the present OKD. To satisfy the identity matrix at Bob’s side for equation (1), the visibility of 
𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 = −1 for both bases (𝜑𝜑1 = 𝜓𝜓1 = {0,𝜋𝜋}) is numerically proved in Fig. 3a for an arbitrary value of 
𝜑𝜑2 = 𝜓𝜓2 = 2𝜋𝜋/5: 𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 = 𝑉𝑉9,10 . Thus, the phase basis set of 𝜑𝜑1 ∈ {0,𝜋𝜋}  becomes continuous because of 0 ≤ 𝜑𝜑2 ≤ 𝜋𝜋, where each 𝜑𝜑2 represents a specific address for networking: 𝜑𝜑2 = 𝜓𝜓2. Practically the possible 
number of CPB for the MZI channel is determined by the detector’s sensitivity. This addressable condition 
(𝜑𝜑2 = 𝜓𝜓2) seems to be obvious if no path-length (phase) change occurs in the MZI channel. In general, the 
invariant MZI path length can be easily achieved even for independent two single-core fibers by using, e.g. a 
laser locking technique due to slow noise generation process [20-22]. Thus, the MZI stability is just a technical 
issue. 
 
Fig. 3. Numerical calculations of visibility VB for OKD. Visibility VB (a) and (b) for 
𝜓𝜓2 = 𝜑𝜑2 = 2𝜋𝜋/5, and (c) and (d) for 𝜓𝜓2 = 0 and 𝜑𝜑2 = 2𝜋𝜋/5. Calculations are based on 
equation (1). 𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 = �𝐼𝐼10−𝐼𝐼9𝐼𝐼10+𝐼𝐼9�: Ii is the intensity of Ei. 
 
Figure 3b shows the 𝜓𝜓1 −independent identity relation (𝜓𝜓1 = 0; 2𝜋𝜋5 ;  𝜋𝜋) for the phase matching in Fig. 3a. 
Although the dashed curve is the only 𝜑𝜑2 −corresponding 𝜓𝜓1 for addressable key distribution, all 𝜓𝜓1 values 
are allowed if 𝜓𝜓1 = 𝜑𝜑1 is satisfied (see the blue and red dots). However, the directionality V5,6 is broken if 
𝜑𝜑1 ≠ 𝜑𝜑1 + 𝜑𝜑2  (see Fig. 2b): 𝑉𝑉5,6 ≠ −1 . Thus, only the dotted curve with 𝜓𝜓1 = 2𝜋𝜋5 (=𝜑𝜑2)  satisfies the 
determinacy condition with 𝑉𝑉5,6 = −1. This is because 𝜑𝜑1 is shifted by the 𝜑𝜑2 value, and the shifted 𝜑𝜑1 
bases affect 𝜓𝜓1 to keep 𝑉𝑉5,6 = ±1 (directionality/determinacy). Then, how does Alice know about her 𝜓𝜓1 
adjustment? This is the power of the addressable networking of CPB in OKD when a 𝜑𝜑2 value is shared with a 
particular 𝜓𝜓2 for a specific address. If 𝜑𝜑2 ≠ 𝜓𝜓2 for a wrong address set, the identity relation (𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 = −1) is 
broken as shown in Figs. 3c and 3d. For the addressable OKD, Bob provides 𝜑𝜑2 − dependent 𝜑𝜑1 for the 
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maximum visibility V5,6 measured by Alice as shown in Fig. 2b:  𝜑𝜑1 = 𝜑𝜑1 + 𝜑𝜑2. If Alice does not know the 
adjusted 𝜑𝜑1 by Bob, then she may randomly choose her basis 𝜓𝜓1 ∈ {0,𝜋𝜋} without adjustment. As a result, the 
visibility VB (=V9,10) for the return light does not satisfy the identity relation as shown in Fig. 3d: 𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 ≠ −1. 
Here, 𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 ≠ −1 means that the detector B4 is also clicked on for E4 indicating an error. Unless Alice knows 
Bob’s 𝜑𝜑2 value, therefore, the key distribution process is failed. This is the addressable CPB property, where 
𝜑𝜑2 represents the address at Bob’s side in OKD networking. The 𝜑𝜑2 −corresponding address at Alice’s side is 
𝜓𝜓2. 
Figure 4 shows numerical calculations of channel measurements in the MZI paths for the proof of 
unconditional security in OKD. The matrix representation [𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀]𝜓𝜓,𝜑𝜑 for both E7 and E8 in the MZI paths of Fig. 
1 is denoted by: [𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀]𝜓𝜓,𝜑𝜑 = 1√2 �−𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓2+𝜑𝜑1) 𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓2+𝜑𝜑1)𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓1+𝜑𝜑2) −𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓1+𝜑𝜑2)�,     (4) 
where �𝐸𝐸7𝐸𝐸8
� = [𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀]𝜓𝜓,𝜑𝜑 �𝐸𝐸10 � (see the Supplementary Material). Figures 4a and 4b show both interference IN7,8 
and visibility V7,8 allowing Eve’s perfect measurements without altering the outputs at Bob’s detectors. The 
channel intrusion by Eve without altering the output fringe is challenging but not impossible. Even in this case 
of perfect measurement, however, knowing the absolute phase information of the light carrier is definitely 
impossible, unless E1 information is given to Eve in advance. Here, the purpose of eavesdropping is to know the 
phase information of the light for keys. Thus, the path superposition in the MZI for coherence optics 
corresponds to the no-cloning theorem in QKD based on nonorthogonal basis sets. According to equation (2), 
Alice’s phase adjustment on 𝜓𝜓1 must be the same as the Bob’s adjustment on 𝜑𝜑1 due to the condition of 
𝜓𝜓2 = 𝜑𝜑2  for directionality. In this balanced case, the Eve’s channel attacking becomes failed due to 
indistinguishable results for two keys as demonstrated in Figs. 4a and 4b. This indistinguishability roots in 
equation (4), where the satisfaction with equation (2) requires the same value in the exponents of the matrix 
elements. Even for the address mismatch (𝜓𝜓2 ≠ 𝜑𝜑2), the measurement randomness in the channel is still 
effective as shown in Figs. 4c and 4d. In this unbalanced case, the value of IN7,8 is just shifted by φ2(≠ ψ2) 
compared to that in Fig. 4(a) according to equation (4). Thus, the randomness or indistinguishability in MZI 
path measurements by Eve is sustained for all 𝜑𝜑2 −dependent network channels. 
 
Fig. 4. Numerical calculations of interference IN7,8  and visibility V7,8 for Fig. 1. (a) IN7,8 and (b) V7,8 for 
𝜓𝜓2 = 𝜑𝜑2 = 2𝜋𝜋/5. (c) IN7,8 and (d) V7,8 for 𝜓𝜓2 = 0 and 𝜑𝜑2 = 2𝜋𝜋/5. The keys are denoted by dots: 
𝜑𝜑1 = 𝜓𝜓1 = 0 (blue); 𝜑𝜑1 = 𝜓𝜓1 = π (red). 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼7,8 = (𝐸𝐸7 + 𝐸𝐸8)(𝐸𝐸7 + 𝐸𝐸8)∗; 𝑉𝑉7,8 = �𝐼𝐼8−𝐼𝐼7𝐼𝐼7+𝐼𝐼8�. 
Regarding the eavesdropping discussed in Fig. 4, however, Eve can set up exactly the same measurement 
tools as Alice and Bob have for both outbound and inbound lights, respectively. Then, Eve simply reads out the 
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visibility as Alice and Bob do. Because the initial MZI condition is not known, Eve’s best chance to guess is 50% 
of Alice’s even with careful phase adjustment for the maximum values: �𝑉𝑉3,4� = �𝑉𝑉7,8� = 1. Thus, both one-way 
determinacy and the round-trip identity/inversion relations in the phase controlled MZI cannot be satisfied to 
eavesdropping, resulting in unconditional security even with perfect channel intrusion. This is the fundamental 
difference of OKD from others such as QKD. The unconditional security in OKD is based on the path 
superposition-caused indistinguishability, where the unconditional security in QKD roots in the Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle applied to dual bases (two nonorthogonal bases) resulting in the no cloning theorem. 
However, Eve may try an offline attack with the recorded data based on coherence optics by simply flipping 
each measured bit value if the decoded data have no meaning. This type of post-measurement attack is still of no 
use if the initialization process between Bob and Alice is randomly repeated to reset the MZI such as done with 
𝜑𝜑2 in Fig. 3. If the MZI is under active phase locking [20-22], Eve’s post-measurement attack is completely 
random for each bit due to random phase fluctuations between the original MZI channel and the Eve’s tapping 
setup for eavesdropping. 
Table 1. Sequence for OKD in Fig. 1. The phase φ1 is denoted without addition of φ2. So does 𝜓𝜓1.       
Party 
         Order 
Sequence 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 set 
Bob 
1 φ1* 0 0 π 0 π π 0 π 0 π  
2 
Prepared 
key: x(φ1) 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 {𝑥𝑥} 
8 VB 1 −1 0.9 1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1  
9 Raw key 0 1 X 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 {𝑚𝑚𝐵𝐵} 
10 Final key 0 1 X 0 1 X 1 0 0 0 {𝑚𝑚} 
Alice 
3 VA 1 1 −1 1 −1 −0.8 1 −1 1 −1  
4  Copy x: y  0 0 1 0 1 −0.8 0 1 0 1 {𝑦𝑦} 
5 𝜓𝜓1 π 0 0 π π π 0 0 π 0  
6 z(𝜓𝜓1) 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 {𝑧𝑧} 
7 Raw key 0 1 0 0 1 X 1 0 0 0 {𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴} 
10 Final key 0 1 X 0 1 X 1 0 0 0 {𝑚𝑚} 
 
Table 1 shows the key distribution sequence in the present OKD. Bob simply prepares a random bit 
sequence for Alice by using his phase basis 𝜑𝜑1. Alice also randomly encodes the Bob-prepared bits for raw keys 
using her phase bases 𝜓𝜓1. Owing to the determinacy and identity relations, the raw key is deterministically 
obtained by simply reading out the visibilities and comparing them with their phase selections without sifting if 
there is no error. Unlike PKD [13], both identity and inversion are used for keys to double the key distribution 
rate (see the Supplementary Material). For error corrections, both parties publically announce their error bits 
(red numbers) and remove them from the raw key. As a result, the same length final key (m) is shared. Here, the 
mark X means a discarded bit. To evaluate an error rate, Alice and Bob randomly pick some samples out of the 
final key sequence and compare them: privacy amplification. The randomly chosen bits for the privacy 
amplification are removed from the final key. Thus, the bit rate in OKD is strongly dependent upon the bit error 
rate as usual. The followings are the key distribution sequence of OKD shown in Table. 1: 
1. Bob randomly selects his phase basis φ1 ∈ {0,𝜋𝜋} to prepare a key and sends it to Alice. 
2. Bob converts the chosen basis φ1 into a key for his key record x: x∈ {0,1}, if φ = 0, x=0; if φ = π, 
x=1. 
3. Alice measures her visibility VA and keeps the record. 
4. Alice copies the Bob’s key for her record y: if VA=1, y=0; if VA=−1, y=1; if 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 ≠ ±1, y=VA (error). 
5. Alice randomly selects her basis ψ1 ∈ {0,𝜋𝜋}, encode the return light, and sends it back to Bob. 
6. Alice converts the chosen basis ψ1 into a key record z: z ∈ {0,1}; if ψ1 = 0, z=0; if ψ1 = π, z=1. 
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7. Alice compares y and z for the raw key mA: m𝐴𝐴 = (y + z) ⊕ 1 at modulus 2. If m𝐴𝐴 ≠ {0,1}, m𝐴𝐴 = 𝑋𝑋 (error). 
8. Bob measure his visibility VB. 
9. Bob set the raw key mB: if 𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 = 1,  m𝐵𝐵 = 0;  𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 = −1,  m𝐵𝐵 = 1. if 𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 ≠ ±1, m𝐵𝐵 = X (error). 
10. Alice and Bob publically announce their error bits and remove them from their raw keys to set the 
shared final key m. 
Lastly, the present OKD can be applied to 1xN and NxN network configurations (see the Supplementary 
Material). As discussed in Figs. 1~4, each 𝜑𝜑2 −dependent phase shift in the 𝜑𝜑1 basis can be individually 
allocated to each wavelength in the DWDM system of fiber-optic communications networks [18], in which the 
single-core fibers will be replaced by multi-core fibers in the near future. In such a multi-core fiber, the MZI 
path length is potentially distance-unlimited due to the environmental noise robustness, where temperature, 
vibration and turbulence are generally the major contributors to the dynamic path-length shift. The laser 
fluctuation in both intensity and phase is also independent of the measurement sensitivity due to the benefit of 
the MZI coherence optics, where ultra-stable detection sensitivity can be provided by even a low-quality laser 
system. For the case of, e.g., a 10 Gpbs key rate at each OKD channel, the coherence length lC is calculated for 
𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶 = 𝑐𝑐Δ = 3 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 in free space. Such a coherence length is long enough even to a bulky system for a carefully 
controlled visibility measurement at transponders. The wavelength converter, optical MUX/DEMUX, and an 
amplifier such as EDFA are coherent devices, so a phase difference between input and output can be locked. 
This fixed phase shift can also be technically adjusted to have the same visibility between Bob and Alice in a 
network preparation stage for address allocation. For a wavelength sharing network configuration, STAR or 
FTTH fiber optic network is also possible. Thus far, we have analyzed and discussed OKD in a phase-controlled 
MZI system for unconditionally secured and deterministic optical key distribution between remote two parties, 
where the networking property of the control phase 𝜑𝜑2 can be used for addressing the network channels by 
allocating a specific phase (𝜑𝜑2) value to a particular remote party (λ) as its network address.  
In summary, an addressable OKD protocol was proposed, analyzed, and discussed for unconditionally 
secured and deterministic optical key distribution in network environments using a phase-controlled Mach 
Zehnder interferometer, in which the key carrier is bright coherent light and the channel measurement 
randomness is due to the quantum superposition between two transmission lines of the MZI channel. Compared 
with current QKD protocols such as BB84 based on single photons in a single transmission line, the proposed 
OKD uses bright coherent light on paired transmission lines composing MZI, resulting in detection loophole-
free, ultrafast, and distance unlimited optical key distribution. Unlike dual bases-based no-cloning theorem in 
QKD, the physics of unconditional security in OKD lies in the quantum superposition between paired 
transmission lines of the MZI channel, resulting in randomness in channel eavesdropping. Owing to the control 
phase 𝜑𝜑2, OKD supports not only a point-to-point transmission scheme but also network configurations. Thus, 
the OKD can be applied to current optical systems in fiber-optic communications networks. Especially in the 
future multi-core fiber networks, the infrastructure of the MZI is fulfilled for the present OKD, where the multi-
core fiber is immune to the environmental noises owing to the proximity among cores on a few micron scale, 
resulting in a potentially unlimited transmission distance. Even in the present single-core fiber systems, a real-
time phase control for the MZI scheme was already shown successfully [22]. Thus, the present OKD may be 
applied for the long lasting goal of one-time-pad cryptography in a classical regime for ultrahigh speed fiber-
optic communications networks [14]. 
The author acknowledges that the present work was supported by the ICT R&D program of MSIT/IITP 
(1711042435: Reliable crypto-system standards and core technology development for secure quantum key 
distribution network). 
 
 
References 
1. S. Matsuoka, “Ultrahigh-speed ultrahigh-capacity transport network technology for cost-effective core 
and metro networks,” NTT Tech. Rev. 9, No. 8 1-7 (2011). 
2. K. Saitoh, “Multicore fiber technology,” J. Lightwave Tech. 34, 55-66 (2016). 
3. R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, “A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key 
cryptosystems,” Communications of the ACM 21, 120–126 (1978) 
8 
 
4. N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittle and H. Zbinden, “Quantum cryptography,” Rev. Mod. Phys. 74, 145-195 
(2002). 
5. C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing,” 
In Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing, volume 
175, page 8. New York, 1984. 
6. B. G. Christensen et al., “Detection-loophole-free test of quantum nonlocality and applications,” Phys. 
Rev. Lett. 111, 130406 (2013). 
7. A. Huang, S.-H. Sun, Z. Liu, and V. Makarov, “ Quantum key distribution with distinguishable decoy 
states,” Phys. Rev. A 98, 012330 (2018).    
8. S. Sajeed, A. Huang, S. Suon, F. Xu, V. Makarov, and M. Curty, “ Insecurity of detector-device-
independent quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 117, 250505 (2016).    
9. W. K. Wootters and W. H. Zurek, “A single quantum cannot be cloned,” Nature 299, 802-803 (1982). 
10. F. Grosshans, G. Van Assche, J. Wenger, R. Brouri, N. J. Cerf, and P. Grangier, “Quantum key 
distribution using Gaussian-modulated coherent states,” Nature 421, 238-241 (2003). 
11. M. Epping, H. Kampermann, C. Macchiavello, and D. Bruß, “Multi-partite entanglement can speed up 
quantum key distribution in networks,” New J. Phys. 19, 093012 (2017). 
12. K. Chen, K. and H.-K. Lo, “Multi-partite quantum cryptographic protocols with noisy GHZ states,” 
Quantum Inf. Comput. 7, 689–715 (2007). 
13. B. S. Ham, “Detection loophole-free photon key distribution using coherent light,” arXiv:2018.04233. 
14. C. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” Bell System Technical Journal. 28, 656–715 
(1949). 
15. V. Degiorgio, “ Phase shift between the transmitted and the reflected optical fields of a semireflecting 
lossless mirror is π/2,” Am. J. Phys. 48, 81 (1980). 
16. A. Zeilinger, “General properties of lossless beam splitters in interferometry,” Am. J. Phys. 49, 882-883 
(1981).  
17. Abbott, B. P. et al. Observation of gravitational waves from binary black hole merger Phys. Rev. Lett. 116, 
061102 (2016). 
18. B. Zhu et al., “High-capacity space-division-multiplexing DWDM transmissions using multicore fiber,” J. 
Lightwave Tech. 30, 486-492 (2012). 
19. C. H. Bennett, “Quantum cryptography using any two nonorthogonal states,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121-
3124 (1992). 
20. E. D. Black, “An introduction to Pound–Drever–Hall laser frequency stabilization,” Am. J. Phys. 69, 79-
87 (2001). 
21. D. Hou, B. Ning, S. Zhang, J. Wu, and J. Zhao, “Long-term stabilization of fiber laser using phase-
locking technique with ultra-low phase noise and phase drift,” IEEE J. Selected Topics Quantum Elec. 20, 
1101308 (2014). 
22. G. B. Xavier and J. P. von der Weid, “Stable single-photon interference in a 1 km fiber-optic Mach-
Zehnder interferometer with continuous phase adjustment,” Opt. Lett. 36, 1764-1766 (2011). 
Supplemental Material  
for “Addressable optical key distribution for unconditionally secured cryptography using 
phase-controlled quantum superposition,” 
by Byoung S. Ham 
Gwangju Institute of Science and Technology, S. Korea 
Email:bham@gist.ac.kr 
 
Using equation (1), the following identity and inversion matrices are obtained for the round trip of light in Fig. 1: 
�
𝐸𝐸9
𝐸𝐸10
� = [BH] �𝐸𝐸10 � = 12 �−�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓2+𝜑𝜑1) + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓1+𝜑𝜑2)� 𝑖𝑖�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓2+𝜑𝜑1) − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓1+𝜑𝜑2)�𝑖𝑖�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓1+𝜑𝜑2) − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓2+𝜑𝜑1)� −�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓2+𝜑𝜑1) + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓1+𝜑𝜑2)�� �𝐸𝐸10 �,  (S1) 
where [BH]= 1
4
[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵]�𝜓𝜓1,2�[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵][𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵]�𝜑𝜑1,2�[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵]. The matrices [BS], �𝜓𝜓1,2�, and �𝜑𝜑1,2� are for the beam 
splitter, control phase shifter Ψ i, and base phase shifter Φ i in the MZI: 
[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵] = 1
√2
�1 𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖 1�,        (S2) 
�𝜓𝜓1,2� = �𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓2 00 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓1�,       (S3) 
�𝜑𝜑1,2� = �𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑2 00 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑1�.       (S4) 
(i) Identity relation: 
From equation (S1), 𝐸𝐸9 = c𝐸𝐸1 and 𝐸𝐸10 = 0 are satisfied, where c is a global phase factor. Thus, the exponent 
of each matrix element in [BH] must be: (𝜓𝜓2 + 𝜑𝜑1) = (𝜓𝜓1 + 𝜑𝜑2).       (S5) 
Because 𝜑𝜑1,𝜓𝜓1 ∈ {0,𝜋𝜋} and 𝜑𝜑1 = 𝜓𝜓1 for the identity relation in PKD (see ref. 18), the following relation is 
obtained for the control phase: 
𝜓𝜓2 = 𝜑𝜑2.        (S6) 
Unlike phase bases 𝜓𝜓1 and 𝜑𝜑1 having the same discrete value either 0 or π, equation (S6) is not restricted. 
Thus, the values of the control phases of  𝜓𝜓2 and 𝜑𝜑2 are continuous between 0 and π. Regardless of the 
control phase value working for the continuous variables, the initially chosen base phase is invariant to the result. 
(ii) Inversion relation: 
From equation (S1), 𝐸𝐸9 = 0 and 𝐸𝐸10 = c𝐸𝐸1 are satisfied. Thus, the exponent of each matrix element in [BH] 
must be: (𝜓𝜓2 + 𝜑𝜑1) = (𝜓𝜓1 + 𝜑𝜑2) ± 𝜋𝜋.     (S7) 
Because 𝜑𝜑1,𝜓𝜓1 ∈ {0,𝜋𝜋} and 𝜑𝜑1 = 𝜓𝜓1 ± 𝜋𝜋 for the inversion in PKD (see ref. 18), the following relation is 
achieved: 
𝜓𝜓2 = 𝜑𝜑2.        (S8) 
Therefore, the control phase relation in equations (S6) and (S8) is universal either it is for identity or 
inversion. For the key distribution process in Fig. 1, Alice randomly selects her phase basis 𝜓𝜓1 to be either 
identical or opposite to the Bob’s choice. If Alice’s basis-phase choice is identical to the Bob’s, it results in the 
identity relation of equation (S5) regardless of the control phase if 𝜓𝜓2 = 𝜑𝜑2, otherwise results in the inversion 
relation of equation (S7). In any case, the equality relation in equations (S6) and (S8) for the control phase 
provides the same result as PKD. In summary, any value of the control phase satisfies OKD for the photon key 
distribution using coherent light if 𝜓𝜓2 = 𝜑𝜑2, and the infinite number of control phase values can be applied for 
infinite number of addresses in OKD. This is the theoretical background of the present continuous variables in 
OKD. 
The matrix representation of ψ1 −controlled return light by Alice (see equation (4)) in the MZI channel of 
Fig. 1 is denoted by: 
�
𝐸𝐸7
𝐸𝐸8
� = 1
2√2
�𝜓𝜓1,2�[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵][𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵]�𝜑𝜑1,2�[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵] �𝐸𝐸10 �      
= 1
2√2
 �𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓2 00 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓1� �1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 1� �1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 1� �𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑2 00 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑1� �1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 1� �𝐸𝐸10 �  = 1
√2
�−𝑒𝑒
𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓2+𝜑𝜑1) 𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓2+𝜑𝜑1)
𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓1+𝜑𝜑2) −𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓1+𝜑𝜑2)� �𝐸𝐸10 �.     (S9) 
According to equations (S5) and (S7), equation (S9) results in 𝐸𝐸7 = 𝐸𝐸9, resulting in the indistinguishability in 
eavesdrwopping for both visibility and interference (see Fig. 4). Thus, the complete randomness is obtained 
from the MZI path superposition. 
Table S1. Key distribution sequence for OKD in Fig. 1. The phase φ1 is denoted without addition of φ2. The 
mark ‘X’ indicates a discarded bit. The red ‘X’ indicates error corrections. Privacy amplification is not shown. 
Party 
         Order 
Sequence 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 set 
Bob 
1 
2 
φ1 0 0 π 0 π π 0 π 0 0  
Prepared 
key: x(φ1) 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 {𝑥𝑥} 
8 VB 1 −1 0.9 1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 −1  
9 raw key X 0 X X 1 1 0 X X 0 {𝑚𝑚𝐵𝐵} 
10 Final key X 0 X X 1 X 0 X X 0 {𝑚𝑚} 
Alice 
3 VA 1 1 −1 1 −1 −0.8 1 −1 1 −1  
4  Copy x: y  0 0 1 0 1 −0.8 0 1 0 0 {𝑦𝑦} 
5 ψ1 π 0 0 π π π 0 0 π 0  
6 z(ψ1) 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 {𝑧𝑧} 
7 raw key X 0 X X 1 X 0 X X 0 {𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴} 
10 Final key X 0 X X 1 X 0 X X 0 {𝑚𝑚} 
Table S1 shows the regular key distribution sequence in OKD. Bob simply prepares a random bit sequence 
for Alice by using his basis 𝜑𝜑1. Alice also randomly encodes the Bob-prepared bits using her phase basis 𝜓𝜓1. 
Owing to the determinacy and identity relations in MZI, the raw key is deterministically obtained by simply 
reading the visibilities and comparing them with their phase selections without sifting. For error corrections, 
both parties publically announce their error bits (red numbers in Table 1) and remove them from the raw key. As 
a result, the same length final key (m) is shared with each other. To evaluate an error rate, Alice and Bob 
randomly pick some samples out of the final key and compare them: privacy amplification. Thus, the bit rate in 
OKD is strongly dependent upon the bit error rate as usual. The following is an example of the key distribution 
sequence for OKD (see Table. S1): 
1. Bob randomly selects his phase basis φ1 ∈ {0,𝜋𝜋} to prepare a key and sends it to Alice. 
2. Bob converts the chosen basis φ1 into a key record: x∈ {0,1}; if φ1 = 0, x=0; if φ1 = π, x=1. 
3. Alice measures her visibility VA and keeps the record. 
4. Alice copies the Bob’s key for her record y: if VA=1, y=0; if VA=−1, y=1; if 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 ≠ ±1, y=VA (error). 
5. Alice randomly selects her phase basis ψ1 ∈ {0,𝜋𝜋} and sends it back to Bob. 
6. Alice converts the chosen basis ψ1 into a key record: z ∈ {0,1}; if ψ1 = 0, z=0; if ψ1 = π, z=1. 
7. Alice compares y and z for the raw key mA: m𝐴𝐴 = (y + z) at modulus 2. If m𝐴𝐴 ≠ 0, discard it, 
otherwise m𝐴𝐴 = z. 
8. Bob measure his visibility VB. 
9. Bob converts VB into his raw key m. If 𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 = −1, m𝐵𝐵 = x, otherwise discard it. 
10. Alice and Bob publically announce their error bits and discard them from the raw key to set a final key. 
Figure S1 shows potential network configurations of OKD, where the control phase 𝜑𝜑2 in Fig. 3 is 
assigned to the wavelength λ to support the DWDM networks. 
 
 
Fig. S1. A schematic of 1xN and NxN configuration for cv PKD. The 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 corresponds to 𝜑𝜑2𝑖𝑖  and 𝜓𝜓2𝑖𝑖 . 
 
